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This paper explores the determinants of scientific research agenda. By using an original dataset 
that includes extensive information about 269 French academic inventors, we analyze why 
scientists choose to perform patentable versus non-patentable research. Usually economic studies 
tackle this problem by using the number of invented patents as a proxy of researchers’ 
willingness to perform patentable research. The originality of the paper is that, in addition to the 
number of invented patents, we rely on a survey-base dependant variable that indicates whether 
or not scientists acknowledge orienting deliberately their research towards patentable areas. Our 
results indicate that past experience with respect to patenting activity matters: academic inventors 
who have already experienced a successful technology transfer are more inclined to orient their 
research towards patentable domains. Similarly, the institutional environment plays an 
explanatory role, whereas conversely, scientific discipline, age and individual research 
performance do not seem to affect the decision to orient research towards patentable areas. Yet, 
age and scientific performance positively influence the number of patents scholars effectively 
invent. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Patenting in academia is a thorny, if salient issue. On the one hand, developed economies face a 
greater involvement of universities into commercial activities, going hand in hand with the 
creation or reinforcement of structures dedicated to technology transfer, and the evolution of 
national legal framework towards higher financial returns for university research. On the other 
hand, the emergence of this “third mission” of universities gives rise to fundamental concerns 
(Siegel et al., 2007). The literature that analyzes the impact of university patenting highlights four 
main threats (recently summarized in Baldini, 2008): threat to scientific progress due to 
restrictions on sharing and using new knowledge; threat to basic research due to changes in the 
remuneration structure of scientists; threat to teaching activities (for similar reasons); and threat 
to industry facing more difficulties to get access to knowledge created by universities (Fabrizio, 
2007). In the present contribution, we choose to focus on the second threat and to investigate the 
selection process of scientific research agenda. 
 
The recent upsurge of patents in science (Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 2004) is likely to 
affect the way scientists select their research contests (Stephan, 1996). Specifically, the 
introduction of patents within the “republic of science” (Palanyi, 1962) may reduce incentives to 
invest in upstream, far from the market research, generating a crowding-out effect of basic 
research in favour of more applied (and potentially patentable) research. In turn, this eviction 
effect might seriously damage long term growth rate (Nelson 1959; 2004). If plausible, all those 
relations remain however assumptions, the exact nature of the consequences of patents on 
scientists research agenda remaining unclear yet. 
 
In such a context, exploring the determinants that influence scientists’ choice of a research 
contest sounds necessary. Few papers already address the issue of scientists’ motivations to 
perform patentable research. Among them, Baldini (2008) and Baldini et al. (2007) provide some 
original empirical investigations of the factors explaining the (Italian) faculty members’ decisions 
to patent or not. The present paper is positioned upstream in the questioning process. We try to 
understand the factors that affect the decision of scientists to orient their research towards more 
or less patentable areas. For this purpose, we use an original dataset composed of 269 French 
academic inventors, i.e. academic professors who are also inventors of at least one European 
patent. Via a survey administered in spring 2008, we collected in depth personal and professional 
information about those academic inventors. 
 
Based on this survey, we estimate two different econometric models. In a first negative binomial 
regression we explore the determinants of the number of patents invented by each academic 
inventor. It is indeed usual in the literature to proxy the willingness of researchers to orient their 
research towards patentable fields by the number of patents they have invented (Van Looy et al., 
2006; Azagra Caro et al., 2006; Carayol, 2007; Stephan et al., 2007). Then, in a second logistic 
regression, we look for the variables that influence scientists declared choice to orient their 
research towards more or less patentable domains. To do so, we rely on an original dichotomised 
dependent variable (built on one specific question of the survey): whether or not academic 
inventors acknowledge orienting their research towards patentable scientific areas. 
 
We deliberately introduce this second regression so as to enrich the first step of analysis and to be 
able to really understand the willingness of scientists to reorient their research due to patent 3 
 
considerations. Such a methodological choice allows us to cope with some of the drawbacks of 
studies that are exclusively based on whether or not researchers have effectively been granted 
patents. It is indeed not because a scientist has been granted a patent that he deliberately orients 
its research toward patentable areas. The patent can be an unexpected outcome of his research as 
well. Similarly, it is not because a scientist has not been granted a patent that he does not orient 
its research towards patentable areas. Here we are therefore able to compare results based both on 
revealed preferences (number of patents invented by each scientist) with declared preferences 
(scientist’s declared decision to orient its research towards patentable areas). 
 
Our results indicate that scientists who belong to labs that are used to massively patent their 
research, who have already experienced successful technology transfer or, on the contrary, who 
already have been obliged to reorient their research due to a risk of patent infringement are more 
likely to orient their research towards patentable areas. Conversely, experience of publication 
delay directly attributable to past patent application, age and scientific performance (measured by 
the number of past publications) do not affect the willingness of scientists to look for patents. 
Yet, age and scientific performance positively affect the number of patents invented by scholars, 
suggesting that the number of invented patents and the willingness to orient its research towards 
patentable areas do not have similar determinants. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
determinants of scientific research agenda and builds the assumptions to be tested. Section 3 
provides detailed information on the methodology and data selected for the study. In section 4 we 
conduct the econometric analysis and discuss the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The problem of problem choice and the patent issue 
 
2.1 Patenting university research and the choice of scientific contest 
 
Most of the time scientists are free to choose their scientific contest. This freedom is an axiom of 
the “republic of science”. To ensure the efficiency of the process, no central regulator should 
constrain scientists to work on some specific topic (Polanyi 1962). In such a loosely-guided 
context, an important issue for researchers deals with the “problem of problem choice” (Carayol 
and Dalle, 2007), i.e. with scientists’ choice of their own research agenda. 
 
The literature in economics of science has shown that scientists select the research they want to 
perform according to three main criteria: gold, puzzle and reputation, with an important weight 
given to reputation and puzzle considerations (Stephan, 1996). This specific objective function 
induces scientists to choose not the more remunerating problems to solve but the more 
challenging ones from an intellectual point of view. This, in turn, intends to encourage scientists 
to devote time and resources to undertake basic research, which is more highly valued by the 
scientific community, and less time and resource to undertake applied research, less considered 
by peers. Hence, the tacit functioning of the “republic of science” ensures – although in an 
imperfect manner- that scientists have incentives to perform basic research, even though this kind 
of research yields, at least in the short run, weak monetary benefits to scientists. 
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The introduction of patents within the “republic of science” may reduce those incentives to 
devote time and resources to perform basic research and increase the advantages associated to 
applied research
1. By definition patents reward applied research. Theoretically, basic research 
hardly lead to patent since they consist in research undertaken without any application in mind, 
while an invention must involve an industrial application to become patentable. It is therefore 
possible that the opportunity to patent university research induces a crowding-out effect of basic 
research in favor of more applied research. Since the latter becomes more rewarded, scientists 
may prefer to engage more resources to do applied, patentable research and less to undertake 
basic, non patentable research.  
 
Yet, Thursby et al. (2007) show that this crowding-out effect of basic research may not 
necessarily occur. Indeed, scientists decide to share their available time between four main 
activities: (1) basic research; (2) applied research; (3) teaching; and (4) leisure. Hence, even 
though the introduction of university patent might lead scientists to prefer applied research, this 
may not be detrimental to basic research and teaching activities provided that scientists 
simultaneously decide to devote less time to leisure. Furthermore, Thursby et al. show that if 
applied research results in both additional applied and basic knowledge (which is the case in 
some specific scientific areas), the introduction of university patent can exhibit an even more 
positive effect (see also Thursby and Thursby (2009) and Perkmann and Walsh (2009) for a 
similar point of view). 
 
Empirical studies do not provide converging results on this crowding-out hypothesis. On the one 
hand, when the outcome of basic research is measured by the number of publications, the 
existence of an eviction effect is rejected. Researchers and labs who patent the most are also 
those who publish the most, which tends to indicate that researchers who are engaged in 
patentable activities do not renounce to basic research (Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Breschi et 
al., 2005; Van Looy et al., 2006; Carayol, 2007; Stephan et al., 2007). For instance, Thursby and 
Thursby (2002) show that changes in the universities’ propensity to patent are more important to 
explain the growth of university patenting and licensing than eventual changes in faculty research 
direction. 
 
On the other hand, a bundle of empirical studies also tend to suggest that academic patenting and 
licensing shift the focus of academic research away from basic to more applied topics. Henderson 
et al. (1998), for instance, find that the quality of academic patent, measured by the number of 
forward citations, tend to decline since the early 80s’. A possible interpretation of this finding is a 
shift of US universities toward more applied research (with a less rich scientific content). Yet, 
Mowery et al. (2004) do not find evidence of such a quality decline. Azoulay et al. (2006) find 
that university patenting may induce scientists to shift their research focus on topics of more 
commercial interest. Czarnitzki et al. (2009) take into account the heterogeneity of patenting 
activities and find out, by using German data, that patents owned by non profits organizations 
such as universities do not decrease publication performance whereas patents owned by firms do. 
 
                                                 
1 Similarly, university patenting may reduce the incentives to spend time and resources on education. Since teaching 
becomes relatively less rewarded than doing patentable research, university professors may tend to reduce the time 
they devote to teaching (Geuna and Nesta 2006). But this question is out of the scope of the present paper. 5 
 
In short, patenting activities may impact the scientific agenda, but the literature does not provide 
a clear-cut conclusion on the nature and intensity of this impact. It is therefore important to 
explore the variables that may affect scientists’ choice of their research contests, and more 
particularly the factors and motivations that lead researchers to undertake patentable research. 
Indeed if the literature flourishes on the potential detrimental impact of academic patenting on 
science and on its potential positive impact on technology transfer, almost nothing exists on the 
origins of the decision to patent for a scientist. Understanding why faculty members engage into 
patentable research areas would however provide interesting avenues to design appropriate 
incentives to catalyse the three complementary missions of university simultaneously. 
 
2.2 Why do scientists choose to engage into patentable research?  
 
We explore here the variables that might explain scientists’ willingness to devote time and 
resources to perform patentable research. We distinguish between contextual explanatory factors 
(disciplinary, organisational, institutional, etc.) and individual explanatory factors (characteristics 
of the scientist, past behaviours, subjective perception) (Figueiredo Moutinho et al., 2007). 
 
Contextual explanatory factors 
 
The literature presents sometimes patenting activities as being in some cases a necessary evil, 
enforced by the context. Within a given professional (more or less patent-friendly) environment, 
the scientific discipline at stake can be the first explanatory variable of scientists’ behaviours. 
Indeed, scientific and technological domains are characterized by diverse levels of patenting 
opportunities and by heterogeneous strategic values associated to patenting (Griliches, 1990). 
Among others, scientific disciplines affect (i) the size of the gap between academic research and 
industrial applications and (ii) the effectiveness of patents as means of protecting inventions 
(Schild, 2004). As a consequence, researchers belonging to different research areas might 
experience different propensity to patent and different patent productivities (Stephan et al., 2007). 
Thus, the first hypothesis we want to test is the following: 
 
Scientific discipline plays a decisive role in scientists’ willingness to engage into 
patentable research areas (H1) 
 
Another part of the institutional environment of the researcher which might affect his research 
agenda is the characteristics of the organisation he is member of. Bercovitz and Feldman (2003) 
talked about “observational learning” in order to stress that the individual choice to engage into 
patentable activity is often influenced by the social context in terms of tolerance and support of 
patenting activities. Being aware of patenting experiences of colleagues may influence one’s 
perception of patents. Hence, the culture at work within the lab might shape the faculty members’ 
choice to patent. The nature of the institution and its history might also affect the incentives of its 
members and the priority order they assign to their different professional missions. This point is 
confirmed by Carayol (2007) who concluded that labs characteristics largely affect individual 
patenting production in universities, and by Callaert et al. (2009) who stress important 
differences with respect to patenting activities between universities and engineering/technical 
schools. Concretely, we expect that:  
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Scientists working for universities and labs actively engaged into patenting activities are 
more willing to orient their research in patentable activities (H2) 
 
If academic patenting is function of the institutional context, Bercovitz and Feldman (2003), 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) and Oven-Smith and Powell (2001) also stress that academic 
patenting is above all strongly influenced by scientists’ attitudes. More precisely individual 
characteristics are decisive, whatever the institutional environment. 
 
Individual explanatory factors 
 
First, the scientist’s personal characteristics matter. Among them gender proves influent. Female 
scientists have been found to patent less than their male counterparts (Breschi et al. 2005; 
Thursby and Thursby, 2005). Link et al. (2007) also found that male scientists are more likely to 
be involved in informal technology transfer from university to industry. However Bunker et al. 
(2005) precised that the quality and impact of women’s patents equals or even exceeds the men’s 
ones. Besides, age might also affect patenting behaviour. Life cycle models exhibit the age of 
scientists as a significant explanatory factor (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Thursby et al., 2007). 
Since basic research mostly yields benefits in the long run, via the increase in the researcher’s 
scientific reputation and its potential professional promotion, older scientists should assign less 
importance to this type of research and be ready to focus on activities, such as patenting, that 
generate more short-run benefits. Similarly, since the career of youngest researchers strongly 
depends upon their publication performance, those researchers should be less inclined towards 
applied and/or patentable activities. Moreover, older (more senior) researchers benefit from a 
wider experience which allows them to more easily assess the value and publication/ patent 
potential of their research results, and in turn leads them to be less concentrated on publishing. 
Similarly and strongly correlated with age, it can be expected that tenured scientists are more 
likely to be involved in patenting and technology transfer activities (Link et al., 2007). It can thus 
be expected that all things being held equal: 
 
The probability for a researcher to orient its research towards more patentable activities 
increases with his age and varies with gender and academic position (H3) 
 
The scientific performance of the researcher might also influence its attitude towards patentable 
research activities. Most empirical studies emphasize a positive link between patenting and 
publishing activities in quantitative terms. Breschi et al. (2004) explain this positive link by the 
existence of a “resource effect” (patent gives scientists more resource and therefore allow them to 
perform better science) and of a “individual productivity effect” (since patents and publications 
are two outcomes of research activities, best researchers, who produce more knowledge, are more 
likely to be granted more patents and more publications than less productive researchers). Yet, 
even though most productive scientists are more likely to be granted patents, they may not 
deliberately orient their research towards patentable domains. On the contrary, those researchers’ 
strong reputation due to good performance in basic research ensures them with a comfortable 
expectation of future earnings, thus removing the burden of having to ensure their living, via 
patenting for instance. Our fourth hypothesis can therefore be stated as follows: 
 
More productive researchers (in terms of number of publications) are not more willing to 
orient their research towards patentable domains than less productive ones (H4) 7 
 
 
The nature of the motivation of the researcher can also explain his more or less important 
inclination towards patenting activities. As emphasized above, researcher’s motivation depends 
upon three elements: reputation, gold and puzzle solving. Being the inventor of a patent might 
result into financial reward since the university shares royalties with the inventors. Thus, being 
involved into patentable research areas might be seen as a way to increase both revenues (through 
direct licensing or the creation of a spin-off based on the patent) and reputation. Incidentally, 
OECD report confirms that patenting at university has a positive influence on researchers’ careers 
and earnings (OECD, 2003). 
 
Therefore, one can expect that researchers who grant more importance to immediate earning are 
more willing to engage into patentable activities. Conversely an important “taste of science” 
(scientists being mostly interested by puzzle solving) should clearly orient scientists toward basic 
research (Levin and Stephan, 1991) and as a consequence, divert them from patentable research. 
Notice that this view is sometimes simplistic. Patenting can be a new challenge for scientists and 
it can also participate to increase their reputation (Baldini et al., 2007). But in general it can be 
expected that: 
 
Scientists primarily motivated by immediate earnings are more willing than those 
primarily motivated by puzzle solving (who have a strong “taste of science”) to orient 
their research towards patentable activities (H5) 
 
Lastly, the opinion of the researcher on the potential drawbacks and advantages of patent may 
also affect its decision to invest time and energy in patentable research topics. Some researchers 
have a very negative image of patents, while others, more entrepreneurial ones, are patent 
enthusiastic. The literature concludes that past experiences in patenting influence the perception 
of the process: those researchers who have never been involved in patenting attribute a higher 
value to the difficulties associated to this activity than those who have already patented 
(Figueiredo Moutinho, 2007). But past patenting activities may also have been very successful, 
revealing the importance of patent to help technology transfer for instance. Such positive 
experience should induce researchers to look for patents again. On the other hand, past patenting 
experiences may have been disappointing, leading to publication delay (Liebeskind, 2001; Cohen 
et al., 2002, this problem being even more accurate in Europe, where the US “grace period” does 
not exist), interdiction of publication, litigations, less time for research, etc. Going one step 
further, Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) conclude that if scientists have had negative experiences 
with technology transfer offices, they invest less time in future patenting processes. So we expect 
that: 
  
Scientists who have a positive opinion on patents are more willing to engage into 
patentable activities than those who have a negative image of patents (H6) 
 
Researchers who have already experienced a successful episode of technology transfer 
due to a patent are more willing to orient their research towards patentable activities 
(H7) 
 
Researchers who have already experienced important delay of publication due to past 
patenting experience (H8a) or who have already been involved in a patent litigation 8 
 
(H8b) or who have been blocked in their research by an existing patent (H8c) are less 
willing to orient their research towards patentable activities 
 
To summarize, we raised in this section hypothesizes on the determinants that affect scientists’ 
willingness to engage into patentable research areas. Some of them refer to researchers’ 
individual characteristics whereas others rather suggest that the decision to select patentable 
research areas is function of the context surrounding scientists. In the next part we detail the 
dataset we use to test those assumptions empirically. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
3.1 The French context for academic patenting 
 
As in most developed countries, French public research organizations are actively engaged in 
patenting activities. In the last decade, the CNRS was systematically ranked in the top ten of 
French patent applicants, INSERM and INRA reaching also high rankings. Regarding French 
universities, they are now intensively patenting their research and there are several evidence that 
this trend is growing (Azagra-Caro et al., 2006; Carayol, 2007; Lissoni et al., 2007). 
 
This recent change in the behavior of French universities can be attributed at least partially to the 
law on innovation and research passed in 1999, which puts a strong emphasis on university-
industry technology transfer and, in particular, on patents. Conversely to the US case, before this 
law French universities were already allowed to patent their invention and, if they did, to own 
and manage their patent with considerable freedom. Yet, the 1999 legislation led to the creation 
of technology transfer offices (TTOs) and incubators in most French scientific universities (some 
of which already had such structures before the law was passed) and encouraged university 
researchers to exploit their research findings, by allowing them to create their own companies 
(strong provision is made to help researchers do so) and to have their inventions patented or co-
patented. 
 
Specifically, before the law it was rather common that scientists took part to patented invention, 
thus being included as inventors in the patent, but the university often used to leave the whole 
ownership to the industrial partner or to the scientist himself. Today, emphasis is placed on the 
fact that French universities have to retain sole ownership of the patent rights or at least share it 
with the firms they have collaborated with. 
 
Thus, the law on innovation has contributed to changing the philosophy of French university 
researchers with respect to patenting. Rather than modifying the legal status of university patents, 
as was the case in the United States, the law has introduced a new strategic orientation, and has 
placed stronger emphasis on technology transfer and patent ownership. Nowadays, French 
universities' TTOs put a lot of pressure on university researchers to get their discoveries patented. 
This change explains why, since the law was passed, the number of university-owned patents has 
increased significantly. 
 
With respect to the remuneration of individual academic inventors, the French authorities also 
decided in 2005 to harmonize the remuneration practices of French universities and to introduce 9 
 
one set of rules that is applicable to all universities. More precisely, when a university grants a 
license to a firm, the revenues derived from licensing are shared following a simple principle: 
first, the technology transfer office is reimbursed for its expenditures. 50% of the remaining sum 
is shared among the inventors (up to a ceiling above which the inventors only share 25% of the 
remaining income) and the other half is shared among the institutions that took part in the 
invention process, namely the different labs and universities in which the inventors are employed. 
As a consequence, in the current legislative context, French academic scientists can earn a 
significant share of the income derived from patenting and licensing their inventions, which 
might motivate them to engage in such an activity. 
 




We collected information about 269 French academic inventors through a survey conducted in 
spring 2008. This sample of inventors stems from a wider population of French academic 
inventors identified in a previous study (Lissoni et al. 2007). By academic inventors we mean 
tenured university lecturers (i.e. “Maître de Conférences” -equivalent to associate professors - 
and university professors) active in a French university in 2004 and designated as inventors on at 
least one patent application submitted to the European Patent Office between 1993 and 2005. 
 
Matching the French university professors with the European patent inventors databases (during a 
European research project entitled KEINS
2) allowed us to identify 1228 confirmed French 
academic inventors. Those are confirmed academic inventors; whenever we had doubt about a 
person's status as inventor (because of homonymy problems for instance) we contacted him/her 
by telephone or email in order to get the confirmation that s/he is both university professor and 
designated as an inventor in a European patent (Lissoni et al., 2007). 
 
Out of these 1228 confirmed French academic inventors to whom we sent a questionnaire by 
email, we collected 280 answers, corresponding to a response rate higher than 20%. Finally, out 
of these 280 respondents, 269 were really exhaustive and useable for our study.  
 
Regarding the survey content, a first section was dedicated to individual information such as age, 
gender, status, etc. The second section was targeted at motives and impediments to patenting 
activity at university. The third part included questions on the consequences of the patent directly 
experienced by the academic inventor. We ran a pilot test of the questionnaire thanks to the help 
of three faculty members of our institution, which allowed us to improve the clarity and 
exhaustiveness of the survey
3. 
 
Profile of the academic inventors 
 
Table 3.1 gives the profiles of the 269 respondents according to their age, gender, academic 
position and scientific disciplines.  
                                                 
2 KEINS is the acronym of “Knowledge based Entrepreneurship: Innovation Networks and Systems”. 
3 The questionnaire is available on request to the authors. For a more detailed description of both the sample and the 
methodology used to collect data, interested reader can consult Pénin (2010). 10 
 
 
Table 3.1: Sample distribution  
Characteristics    % in the sample 
Age 













Biological sciences  15 
Chemical sciences  29 
Electronics 16 
Medical sciences  10 




Our respondents are mostly male (90%), University professors (57%) and over 40 years old (88% 
of the respondents is more that 40 years old). We find in our sample all the disciplines where 
universities are used to patent: electronics, biology, chemistry, pharmaceuticals and engineering 
(social sciences being not represented). All those figures are consistent with the sampling 
population of French academic inventors (Lissoni et al., 2007; Pénin, 2010). 
 
3.3 Econometric analysis 
 
In order to investigate the determinants of scientists’ willingness to perform patentable versus 
non patentable research, we run two different econometric models (Table 3.2). In a first one, we 
proxy researchers’ willingness to perform patentable research by the number of patents they have 
invented and we explore the impact of different explanatory variables on this number of invented 
patents. We construct this dependent variable by taking all the EPO patents invented by each 
researcher between 1993 and 2005. As usually done in this case, we estimate this model by 
relying on a negative binomial specification
4. 
 
In our second model, we run a logit regression to explore the variables that influence the declared 
choice of academic inventors to orient their research towards more or less patentable domains. To 
do so, we rely on an original dichotomised dependent variable (built on one specific question of 
the survey addressed to academic inventors). This variable scores 1 if the inventor acknowledges 
                                                 
4 A zero inflated model would not be relevant here since we do only consider academic inventors, i.e. scientists who 
have already invented at least one patent. 11 
 
orienting his research towards patentable areas and 0 otherwise (Table 3.2)
5. This second 
regression enables us to enrich the first step of analysis with empirical results calculated on 
declarative data. Indeed, such a methodological choice allows us to overcome an important 
drawback of most studies on the topic (Van Looy et al., 2006; Azagra Caro et al., 2006; Carayol, 
2007; Stephan et al., 2007), namely the validity of granted patents as an indicator of research 
orientation. Former studies that explore the influence of explanatory variables on the number of 
invented patents at the level of the university, the lab or the scientist, do not really assess the 
impact of university patent on the agenda of research because patent cannot always be taken as 
such as an indicator of the orientation of the research. It is indeed not because a scientist has been 
granted a patent that he deliberately orients its research toward patentable areas. The patent can 
be an unexpected outcome of his research as well. Similarly, it is not because a scientist has not 
been granted a patent that he does not orient its research towards patentable areas. 
 





Description of the 
dependant variable 
Minimum Maximum Average
Model 1  Negative 
binomial 
PATENT  Integer=number of EPO 
patents invented by the 








Model 2  Logit  RES_ 
AGENDA 
dummy=1 if researcher 
acknowledges that he 
tries to orient its research 
in fields where he knows 
it will be possible to 











In sum, our data have the advantage of considering the willingness of academic inventors to 
orient their research due to patent considerations. Thanks to our survey we are able to compare 
two models: One that relies on revealed preferences and tries to explain the number of invented 
patent (model 1) and one that relies on declared preferences and tries to explain the determinants 
of scientists’ willingness to apply for patents (model 2). Those two models are likely to give 
interesting complementary insights and to distinguish when a patent is the consequence of a 
deliberate choice of the scientist versus an involuntary by-product of his activity. 
 
It is important to stress here one limit of our study: We work on academic inventors, which 
means that we only have information on scientists who have already been mentioned as patent 
inventors. We lack a control sample in which we would have information on scientists with no 
experience in patenting activities. This means that what we explain is the probability that a 
scientist orients its research towards patentable field (model 2) or the number of invented patents 
(model 1), knowing that the scientist has already been granted a patent. 
                                                 
5 The exact question was the following: “Does the possibility to be granted patents influence the nature of your 
research? (only one possible answer)”. Then respondents had the choice between three answers: “Yes, I try to orient 
my research in fields where I know it will be possible to apply for patents”, “No” or “I don’t know”. 19,4% of the 
respondents answered “yes”, 77,4% “no” and 3,3% “I don’t know”. Notice that in the question we voluntarily did not 
use the words “applied research” and “basic research” in order to dismiss any misunderstanding from respondents. 12 
 
 
3.4 Description of the independent variables 
 
To test the different hypotheses presented in section 2, we mainly rely on information collected 
through the survey described above. This survey provides us with information about academic 
inventors’ motivations to apply for patent, their experience with respect to patenting activities, 
their institutional environment, their opinion with respect to university patent, etc. Furthermore, 
via queries in ISI web of science, we were able to attribute to each researcher his number of 
authored publications, which we use as a proxy of the individual research performance. Overall, 
we have therefore twelve explanatory variables, which are displayed in Table 3.3.  
 
Variables built on external data sources 
 
-  Hypothesis 1, on the effect of scientific discipline is tested by the use of sectoral 
dummies. Those dummies rely on the CNU (French “Conseil National des Université”) 
classification of each scientist (Table 3.1). They are therefore an indicator of scientific 
disciplines and not of industrial sectors. 
-  Hypothesis 2, on the role of the institutional environment is tested via two independent 
variables: First, we built an indicator of the quality of the university each academic 
inventor belongs to, using the latest Shangai ranking (UNI_PERF). Second, we introduce 
the patent policy of the lab the researcher belongs to (LAB_PAT_POL). This latter 
information is collected through the survey in which we asked respondents to report 
whether or not their laboratory is involved in a policy of systematic patenting of their 
research. 
-  We use the age and the gender of the researcher to test hypothesis 3 (AGE and GENDER 
variables). We do not introduce the grade of the researcher due to its high correlation with 
the age variable. 
-  To test hypothesis 4 we built the PUBLI variables which accounts for the scientific 
productivity of academic inventors. Concretely, using “ISI web of science” we collected 
and summed all the publications attributed to each of the surveyed scientists. This 
variable is a classical indicator of scientific performance. It is not weighted by citations 
here. 
 
Variables stemming from the survey 
 
-  To test hypothesis 5 we rely on the answers to a question in which we asked respondents 
whether or not their motivation to apply for a patent was to increase immediate earnings 
via licensing royalties (EARN_MOTIV). Although it is obvious that this variable cannot 
account for the complex set of scientists’ motivations, it provides an indicator of the 
importance that academic inventors grant to immediate earnings as opposed to other 
motivations, such as reputation or scientific curiosity. 
-  To test hypothesis 6 we asked inventors whether they believe that university patent may 
undermine the norms of open science, i.e. may decrease trust and exchanges among 
scientists and decrease the rate of diffusion of research results. The answer to this 13 
 
question reflects the scientist’s subjective perception of university patent 
(PAT_PERCEPT)
 6. 
-  Finally, hypotheses 7 and 8 are tested with the help of three variables built from answers 
to the survey. We asked whether or not the respondent: 
o  Has already experienced a successful case of technology transfer and whether or 
not this success was directly attributable to the patent application (PAT_TT) (H7) 
o  Has already suffered from a delay in the publication process due to the patent 
application (PUB_DELAY) (H8a). 
o  Has already been involved in a patent litigation (PAT_LITI) (H8b)  
o  Has already been obliged to reorient its research due to the risk of patent 




Results of the two econometric models are given in Table 4.1.  
 
A first interesting finding is that the age of scientists (the AGE variable) does not affect their 
willingness to perform patentable research (model 2), thus invalidating hypothesis 3. This finding 
contradicts the hypothesis that older scientists may be more willing to apply for patent in order to 
constitute a complement of revenue for their pension (Carayol, 2007). However, in model 1 age 
is significantly and positively correlated to the number of patents invented by scientists. This 
second finding is hardly surprising, since our model does not measure scientists’ yearly 
productivity but the total number of invented patents over the career of the scientist. This result is 
therefore likely to reflect a time effect. Older scientists have had a longer career than younger 
ones and therefore have had more time to accumulate experience, knowledge and, as a 
consequence, patents. Yet, even though this result must be taken with care, our findings, suggest 
that although older scientists may be granted more patents they do not act deliberately in order to 
do so. Patents seem to be an unintended outcome of their research activity. 
 
Similarly, scientific performance (proxied by the number of scientific publications, the PUBLI 
variable) does not significantly affect academic inventors’ willingness to perform patentable 
research but positively and significantly explains the number of patents invented. This result is 
consistent with most of other empirical studies that found a positive relationship between 
publishing and patenting at the scientist level
7. This suggests the existence of an “individual 
productivity effect” (Breschi et al., 2004): Best scientists are good both for patenting and 
publishing, which explains why the most productive scientists are also the ones who patent the 
most. Yet, those productive scientists do not specifically tend to orient their research towards 
patentable areas. If they patent more frequently it is because patents are a by-product of good 
science. 
 
                                                 
6 Respondents are mostly favourable to university patenting. They have a positive, and sometimes enthusiastic, 
image of university patenting (Pénin, 2010). 
7 There are many strategic complementarities between patent and publications. Some researchers patent in order to 
publish without risking losing control on their ideas; others use publications as a way to stop firms from patenting 
(defensive publications) or publish around an invention (and a patent) as a way of marketing their idea to potential 
users, etc. See Schild (2004) for a collection of statements made by Swedish patenting scientists on the topic. 14 
 
 
Table 3.3: Description of the explanatory variables 
Name Type  Minimum Maximum  Average
AGE  Integer={1,2,3,4,5}, according to the age of the 
respondent in 2008. 1=between 30 and 40, 2=between 
40 and 50, 3=between 50 and 60, 4=between 60 and 70 
and 5=older than 70 
1 5  2,66 
GENDER Dummy,  1=  male  0  1  0,90 
UNI PERF  Integer={0,1,2,3,4,5}, according to the Shangai 2006 
ranking of the university to which the researcher 
belongs. 0=not among top 500, 1=between 500 and 
400, 2=between 400 and 300, 3=between 300 and 200, 
4=between 200 and 100 and 5 = among the top 100. 
0 5  1,6 
LAB PAT POL  Dummy, 1=researcher’s lab has a policy of systematic 
patent application 
0 1  0,36 
PUBLI  Integer= number of past publications SCI before 2005  0  177  19,8 
PAT PERCEPT  Integer={0,1,2,3,4,5}, according to whether or not the 
researcher believes that university patenting 
undermines the culture of open science. 0=strongly 
disagree; 5=strongly agree. 
0 5  1,03 
PAT LITI  Dummy, 1= researcher has already been involved in a 
patent litigation 
0 1  0,14 
PUB DELAY  Integer={0,1,2,3,4}, according to whether or not 
researcher has already experienced a delay in the 
publication of its research directly attributable to a past 
patent application. 0=no delay; 1=delay lower than 6 
months, 2=delay between 6 months and 1 year, 3=delay 
between 1 and 2 years, 4=delay higher than 2 years. 
0 4  1,87 
PAT TT  Dummy, 1=researcher has already experienced 
technology transfer (commercialization or 
industrialization of an invention) directly due to 
academic patenting 
0 1  0,33 
BLOCK PAT  Dummy, 1=researcher has already been obliged to 
reorient its research in the past to get round a patent 
held by another researcher 
0 1  0,25 
EARN MOTIV  Integer={0,1,2,3,4,5}, according to whether or not the 
researcher considers that to increase its immediate 
earning through royalties is an important motivation to 
apply for a patent. 0= not important at all; 5=very 
important 
0 5  0,86 
SCIENTIFIC 
DISCIP. 
Dummy for technological field: {Electronics, chemical 
sciences, biological sciences, medical sciences, 
pharmaceuticals and drugs, engineering sciences, 
others}, reference=biological sciences 
See Table 3.1 
 
 
Sectoral dummies are not significant in model 2, thus invalidating hypothesis 1 (In model 1 the 
dummy for chemistry is the only significant one). This finding is particularly remarkable since 
important sectoral differences are usually observed with respect to patenting strategies (Cohendet 15 
 
et al., 2009). Our work indicates on the contrary that there is no sectoral difference (researchers 
behave in a similar way across disciplines) both in scientists’ willingness to invent patent and in 
the number of invented patents. Chemistry is the only discipline exhibiting some specificities 
regarding the total number of invented patents. One possible interpretation is that applying for 
patent and being granted a patent might be easier in this field than in the others. 
 




Model 1  Model 2 
Dependant variable: Patent  Dependant variable: Res_Agenda 
Coefficient Std  error  Coefficient  Std  error 
AGE  0,298 (***)  0,0565 0,121  0,186 
GENDER 0,167  0,198  -0,241  0,639 
UNIPERF 0,003  0,028  0,068  0,093 
LAB_PAT_POL  0,182 (*)   0,107      1,320 (***)  0,368 
PUBLI  0,010 (***)  0,001 0,006  0,008 
PAT_PERCEPT  -0,076 (*)   0,040     0,305 (**)  0,123 
PAT_LITI 0,169  0,138  -0,148  0,481 
PUB_DELAY 0,007 0,041  0,146  0,142 
PAT_TT  0,190 (*)   0,108    0,604 (*)  0,366 
BLOCK_PAT  0,387 (***)   0,111    0,948 (**)  0,376 
EARN_MOTIV  0,070 (**)  0,034 0,153  0,110 
Chemical_science  0,386 (**)  0,162 0,539  0,570 
Electronics 0,252  0,188  0,621  0,639 
Medical_science -0,205  0,213  -0,808  0,882 
Pharma_and_drug -0,042  0,210  0,522  0,664 
Engineering 0,070  0,213  0,524 0,712 
Others 0,355  0,230  0,530  0,798 
Const  -0,659 (***)   0,264    -3,964 (***)  0,903 
Note: (***) significant at the level of 1%, (**) significant at the level of 5%, (*) significant at the level of 10%. 
 
Fourth, researchers’ institutional environment is likely to affect their patenting behavior: The lab 
patenting policy (LAB_PAT_POL) does positively and significantly influence both the 
researcher willingness to engage in patentable areas (model 2) and the number of invented 
patents (model 1). Put differently, the more a lab is engaged in an active patenting policy, the 
more its research members tend to orient their research towards patentable fields (hence 
validating hypothesis 2) and, as a consequence, the more its research members tend to invent 
patent. 
 
Going on with the influence of the researchers’ institutional environment, our empirical results 
show that the university performance (UNI_PERF) is not significant, neither in model 1 nor in 
model 2. This may be due either to the proxy we use (The Shanghai ranking, whose relevance is 
often criticized) or to the peculiarity of the French research and higher education system, in 
which universities are mainly dedicated to teaching, the research being mostly undertaken at the 16 
 
level of the lab. When it comes to research, universities may hence be a non appropriate unit of 
analysis. 
 
Surprisingly direct earning motivations (the EARN_MOTIV variable) are not significant in 
model 2 but are positively and significantly correlated with the number of invented patents in 
model 1. This result suggests that although scientists motivated by money do not specifically 
orient their research towards patentable areas, they succeed to invent more patents than their 
colleagues having other motivations. 
 
Lastly, with respect to past patenting experience of researchers, we find three original results. 
 
First, researchers who have already experienced a patent blockage in the past are more likely to 
look for patents and to invent patents. The BLOCK_PAT variable is indeed positive and 
significant in both models
8.  This result, counterintuitive at first glance (and contradicting 
hypothesis H8c), is likely to reflect the defensive value of patents. Researchers who have already 
been victims of a patent blockage, who have been compelled to stop or reorient some of their 
research due to the risk of patent infringements may be more aware of such a risk and therefore 
may be more interested to get a protection against it. In such a context, gathering a patent 
portfolio can be seen as a strategy dedicated to protect oneself against patent attacks: A 
researcher who holds its own patents can try to cross-license them and therefore may be more 
likely to preserve a freedom of research than a researcher who would not have any patent. An 
interesting question raised here is therefore whether this behavior of defensive patenting, which 
has mostly been observed at the level of the firm (because it requires important funds in order to 
collect significant patent portfolios), can be relevant at the level of academic scientists. 
 
Second, the PAT_TT variable is positive and significant in both models 1 and 2: researchers’ past 
experience of technology transfer does affect their current patenting behavior. More precisely, 
researchers who have already experienced a successful episode of technology transfer from 
academia to industry in the past, and who believe that applying for a patent was decisive for the 
success of this technology transfer, are more likely to look for patent today. Those researchers 
have indeed already experienced the advantages of patent to foster science-industry linkages, 
which makes them more willing to apply again. Hypothesis 7 is therefore validated. 
 
Third, the publication delay variable (PUB_DELAY) is significant neither in model 1 nor in 
model 2, which means that there is no link between past publication delays imposed by the 
patenting process and the willingness to look for new patent application (thus contradicting 
hypothesis H8a). An explanation may be that academic inventors do not care about publication 
delay either because they do not believe in the norms of open science or, more likely, because 
                                                 
8 Linked to this point, the PAT_LITI variable is not significant in both models 1 and 2, which indicates that 
academic inventors who have already experienced a patent litigation are not more or less willing to apply for patents. 
This is likely to be due to the fact that a patent litigation can lead to very different outcomes. A patent litigation may 
be either a positive or a very negative experience for the scientist. And we do not know here whether or not the 
litigation has been settled at the advantage or at the disadvantage of the respondent. Another potential reason why 
university research does not seem influenced by scientists’ past experiences in terms of patent litigations might be 
the regular infringement of patents by university researchers highlighted by Yancey and Stewart (2007). 
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they perceive that this delay is not so important as compared with the advantages of  patents, such 
as better links with industry, successful technology transfer, etc. 
 
This last explanation tends to be confirmed by the effect of the patent perception variable 
(PAT_PERCEPT). Conversely to what was expected in hypothesis 6, it appears that the more 
academic inventors believe that patent undermines the norms of open science, the more they are 
likely to orient their research towards patentable areas. We interpret this finding as a sign that 
researchers who specifically orient their research towards patentable areas are not naive when 
they come to assess the consequences of patent in science. Those scientists are perfectly clear and 
aware of the drawbacks and shortcomings of patents but also of their importance to foster 
technology transfer and links with industries. It might also testify the discrepancy between the 
official discourse of academic inventors (it is dangerous for science to engage into patenting 
activity) and their effective behavior (engaging more and more energy in this lucrative activity 




This paper is a first attempt to understand why some academic members may tend to orient their 
research towards patentable areas. As such, this work departs from the existing literature because 
we not only try to explain the number of invented patents but also, and most of all, scientists’ 
decision to orient their research towards patentable domains. This makes an important difference, 
since considering only the number of invented patents does not really take into account scientists’ 
willingness to perform patentable research. Some researchers patent whereas they do not really 
look for it, while others try to patent but are not successful. By using an original dataset that 
includes extensive information about 269 French academic inventors, we have thus analyzed the 
determinant of scientists’ willingness to perform patentable versus non patentable research. 
 
Our econometric analysis exhibits the following results: Older academic inventors are granted 
more patents than younger ones but do not more frequently orient their research towards 
patentable domains. Patents seem therefore to be the outcome of experience and not of the 
willingness of older academic inventors to earn additional revenues. We also found that the 
number of scientific publications is not significant to explain the choice of academic inventors to 
orient their research towards patentable domains. Yet, scientists who have more publications are 
also those who patent the most. Sectoral dummies did not prove significant either. Chemistry put 
apart, the discipline does not influence either the inclination to do patentable research or the 
number of patents invented. Our empirical analysis also allows us to show that academic 
inventors who belong to labs that massively patent their research have a higher probability to 
orient their research towards patentable areas and to invent patents. Yet, we do not observe any 
university effect. Scientists who belong to the best French universities do not behave differently 
than others. Lastly, experience of publication delay does not appear to hinder academic inventors’ 
willingness to patent, whereas a successful past experience in technology transfer motivate 
scientists to engage into patentable research. 
 
Those results are interesting in order to understand scientists’ motivations for patenting. Indeed, 
by finding that the determinants to engage into patentable areas on the one hand, and to 
effectively invent patent on the other hand, significantly differ, we point out the fact that in 
France, patenting at universities is not always the outcome of a deliberate choice. More precisely, 18 
 
scientists who patent are not systemically more inclined to select more patentable research areas. 
Patents often seem to be a by-product of research activity rather than a specific target they want 
to address. This, in turn, suggests that either patenting does not systematically distort the research 
agenda of researchers or that, if it does, it is on the long run. Patenting being indeed a long lasting 
process, scientists who are really motivated by patenting activities may have not been granted the 
IPR they are looking for yet. 
 
Furthermore those results may be informative for policy makers. Indeed, understanding the 
criteria that influence scientists’ choice of their research agenda is crucial in order to be able to 
design adequate incentive schemes for scientific research. In particular, understanding why 
scientists are looking to apply for patents is important if policy makers want to increase the 
number of university patents, as it seems to be the case in most developed countries (the question 
of the desirability of this policy is beyond the scope of this discussion). For instance, our finding 
that past and successful experience of patenting matters and plays a catalytic role on scientists’ 
forthcoming patenting activity suggests that measures should be undertaken so as to ease the first 
patent application. Similarly, the significant role played by the lab policy testifies that patents 
should be more systematically integrated in the assessment grid used by public financers when 
evaluating the labs they are going to support. Sponsoring actively patenting labs would in turn 
motivate the researchers of those labs to continue to get involved or even increase their patent 
activity. 
 
This work was a first step towards a better comprehension of the determinants of the scientific 
research agenda. Yet, more work is still needed. For instance, it will be necessary to construct a 
control sample including non inventor scientists, i.e. scientists who have not applied for a patent 
yet but might be motivated to do it. By restricting our study to academic inventors we consider 
only a small fraction of the scientific population and, above all, it is likely that those academic 
inventors behave differently than other scientists. A second possible extension is to develop 
international comparisons. Academic patenting is indeed likely to be very sensitive to national 
contexts. Finally, it may be interesting to get information on the fate of the patents university 
members have developed (whether or not they have been exploited by a spin-off, sold to a large 
firm, abandoned? Did they give rise to a license agreement? etc.) so as to test whether the result 
(and ownership) of intellectual property emanating from university research influences the 
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